Name der Zeitschrift: Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie Jahrgang: 64 Heft: 5 Seiten: 806-827.

In German discussions over the last twenty years of the difference between what it is to be a body (in German: Leibsein) and what it is to have a body (Körperhaben), many have been concerned to remind us that we owe this conceptual distinction to the philosophical anthropologist Helmuth Plessner. He introduces the distinction in an essay from 1925—written in collaboration with the Dutch behavioral researcher Frederick Jacob Buytendijk—“Die Deutung des mimischen Ausdrucks. Ein Beitrag zur Lehre vom Bewusstsein des anderen (...) Ichs” (“The Interpretation of Mimetic Expressions: A Contribution to Understanding One’s Consciousness of Other Subjects”). Buytendijk later explained that it was Plessner who worked out the .. (shrink)

Why has the global West (North America, Europe) handled the covid-19 pandemic and the corresponding economic crisis so much worse than the global East (East Asia)? The crises demonstrate the degree to which the West is shaped by its forms of competition and the East by its forms of cooperation. In the West, we have become habitualised to American neoliberalism over the last two generations. In the East, varieties of neo-Confucianism and neo-Buddhism have been transformed into national cultures. The way (...) humans understand their position in the world intellectually and react to crises according to corresponding habit makes an effective difference. The present comparison between global East and West makes use of Hannah Arendt’s conception ofpoliticsand theshared worldas well as of Helmuth Plessner’s conception ofmediated immediacyin forms ofmodern biopower. The pandemic is a catalyst within the decline of the West and the rise of the East. (shrink)

Wie ist es möglich, im Hinblick auf anthropologische Fragen über die problematischen Ausdrücke von Lebewesen angemessen zu sprechen? – Helmuth Plessners philosophische Anthropologie folgt einer Kombination von Methoden, um a) lebenden Phänomenen begegnen und sie beschreiben zu können , b) die Kontraste dessen zu rekonstruieren, das als Präsupposition in a) verwendet worden ist , c) eine Hypothese über die allgemeinen kulturellen Präsuppositionen zu bilden und sie in der Entdeckung neuer Phänomene zu bewähren , und d) schließlich denjenigen Bruch im Selbstverständnis (...) zu rekonstruieren, das die Lebensführung im Ganzen ermöglicht. Gegenwärtige Philosophien haben kein derartiges Verfahren zur kritischen Kontrolle der Verwendung von anthropologischen Demarkationen. (shrink)

Abstract John McDowell argues for minimal empiricism via using the notion of second nature of human beings. I should like to invite him to discuss Helmuth Plessner's Philosophical Anthropology in order to elaborate a more substantial conception of second nature. McDowell seems to think that it is adequate for his more epistemological aim to remind us of second nature as though it were to be taken for granted. But I think, following Plessner, that this right reminder needs a therapeutic elaboration (...) in Kant's sense of propaedeutics. What had been called our second nature found itself being questioned in order to limit the range of ways of treating the self we can authorize. (shrink)

Though Helmuth Plessner (1892-1985) elaborated his philosophical anthropology independently of the classical pragmatisms, there are many parallels with them. He combined a phenomenology of living beings (a parallel with William James) with a semiotic reconstruction (a parallel with Charles Sanders Peirce) of what we are already using whenever we specify living beings, among them ourselves as human living beings in nature, culture, and society. In Plessner’s distinction between having a body (Körperhaben) and being (or living) a body (Leibsein), there is (...) a parallel with George Herbert Mead’s “Me” (taking over the perspective of others) and “I” (spontaneous actions/reactions of an organism in a situation). Dewey and Plessner elaborated a public procedure for overcoming the old dualism of matter and idea in a process of learning better habits. Their historical conceptions of communication involve the primacy of interactions on three levels (discursive, conscious, pre-conscious living). Facing the plasticity of human conduct, both approaches open the door to a pluralistic self-understanding that includes value-conflicts and that therefore needs civilized forms to solve such conflicts. With regard to the limits of human conduct, Plessner proposed a phenomenology (of laughing and crying) that seems to have no equivalent in pragmatism. (shrink)

Responsibility means not just to give the right response to a question. It should not necessarily succeed to ask and respond about acts, and to submit them to some discursive rules. In fact, responsibility is related to an indefinite questioning: How could some question-answer-rules, which consequences exceed a situation, be adequately applied to this situation? To give an answer to this questionability, it would be necessary to move in a self-relating language as well as in a distancing intuition. Thus, the (...) author argues that it would be irresponsible if the philosophic-anthropological question about the human being could be answered by the application of some discursive rules. (shrink)

In the first part the text specifies Hannah Arendt's philosophical approach in three dimensions: a) She used Max Scheler's new phenomenology of living beings . b) She transformed Karl Jaspers' extraordinary limit situations of human conduct into anthropological conditions. c) Such conditions are questions that do need answers in forms of "vita active" and of "vita contemplative". Arendt moved from Max Scheler's Philosophical Anthropology to her own historical conception of the human condition inside the heterogeneity of our Occidental tradition. The (...) second part of this paper gives an overview about her network of concepts that enables a comparison of Occidental cultures via the change of dominance in relations of vita active and vita contemplative. The third part situates her approach between those of Michel Foucault and Charles Taylor in a debate that is needed at present. Her historic-phenomenological anthropology allows her a critique of modernity without a hermeneutic circle and without an anthropological circle. (shrink)

Name der Zeitschrift: Internationales Jahrbuch für philosophische Anthropologie Jahrgang: 5 Heft: 1 Seiten: 15-32.

Name der Zeitschrift: Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie Jahrgang: 65 Heft: 2 Seiten: 302-336.

Why has the global West (North America, Europe) handled the covid-19 pandemic and the corresponding economic crisis so much worse than the global East (East Asia)? The crises demonstrate the degree to which the West is shaped by its forms of competition and the East by its forms of cooperation. In the West, we have become habitualised to American neoliberalism over the last two generations. In the East, varieties of neo-Confucianism and neo-Buddhism have been transformed into national cultures. The way (...) humans understand their position in the world intellectually and react to crises according to corresponding habit makes an effective difference. The present comparison between global East and West makes use of Hannah Arendt’s conception of politics and the shared world as well as of Helmuth Plessner’s conception of mediated immediacy in forms of modern biopower. The pandemic is a catalyst within the decline of the West and the rise of the East. (shrink)

The conceptual distinction between what it is to be a body and what it is to have a body was first construed by the philosophical anthropologist Helmuth Plessner.This article deals with two common problems within the German discourse on the theme.The first derives from a misunderstanding that the 3 categories body, living body, and person signify distinct entities, whilst what Plessner is actually referring to is the various modes in which a person′s life is led. Neither the modes of body (...) nor living body has primacy per se, and the person lives by doubling itself into a public and private person situated in a shared world outside of centric correlations .The second point of contention relates to Plessner′s methodology in developing the distinction between Leib and Körper. He believed in combining a plurality of methods in accordance with the phenomenon, its understanding, and the stances or positionings taken up by living persons. The indeterminacy and unfathomability of persons in the leading of their lives emerges from the variety of their perspectives and changing historical aspects. It is only the invalid extension of these perspectives and aspects to the whole of the future that leads to false promises – to the animal ideologicum who is unable to endure its questionability. The homo absconditus, by contrast, lives in scepticism of positive absolutisms. The questionability of his form of life keeps him open. (shrink)

Menschenaffen erganzen ihr Instinkt- und Triebleben positivistisch durch individuelle Intelligenz, Sozialitat und Kulturalitat.

Während seit einiger Zeit im Feuilleton ein Kulturkampf zwischen Vertretern des "Gehirns" und des "Geistes" ausgefochten wird, haben führende Neurobiologen und Philosophen – unter Beteiligung einer Soziologin, eines Mathematikers und zweier Physiker - in der "Deutschen Zeitschrift für Philosophie" eine Sachdiskussion zu den Grenzfragen der Hirnforschung geführt. Neben der hier vorgelegten vollständigen Neuedition dieser Auseinandersetzung umfasst ca. ein Drittel des Bandes sämtliche Beiträge einer bisher unveröffentlichten Schlussrunde, die eine vorläufige Bilanz zieht, die strittig bleibt. Alle Diskussionsteilnehmer sind sich in der (...) Intention einig, dass weder der reduktive Naturalismus noch der ontologische Dualismus von Gehirn und Geist überzeugen können. Uneins bleiben aber nicht nur die Neurobiologen und Philosophen gegen einander, sondern auch die Philosophen und die Neurobiologen jeweils untereinander. Der Dissens betrifft die Frage, wie ihre schwache Gemeinsamkeit methodologisch und geschichtlich, ontologisch und ontisch so durchgeführt werden kann, dass keine Selbstwidersprüche eintreten: Für die Erfüllung des eigenen Anliegens wird noch etwas Anderes in Anspruch genommen, als man selbst zugleich zu erklären vermag. Personale Lebewesen bzw. lebende Personen vollziehen sich anders, als dualistisch konzipiert werden kann. (shrink)

Obwohl Scheler seine Phänomenologie bereits vor und nach dem Ersten Weltkrieg ausarbeitete, kann sie heutzutage, am Beginn des Weltbürgerkriegs um die Teilnahme am Weltbürgerrecht, bestätigt werden. Emotionale Zustände und Gefühle werden betrachtet wie Wörter, die in Äußerungen Sinn machen, das heißt in emotionalen Bewegungen während Aktivitäten oder in Stimmungen. Der Unterschied zwischen dem eigenen Selbst und dem anderen Selbst wird ermöglicht durch eine Selbstbeziehung der ambivalenten Sympathie, die sich von Empathie unterscheidet.Nur Liebesbewegungen ermöglichen eine Selbstbindung in Werten der Personalität. Solche (...) Werte ermöglichen als Gegenprogramm zu der fortwährenden dualistischen Auspolarisierung von lebensfremden Fehlalternativen ein „Weltalter des Ausgleichs“ . Für den Beobachter baut Liebe ein solches Lebensszenario auf, während Hass es zerstört. Man sollte diese Bewegungen nicht durcheinanderbringen mit Leidenschaften und Affekten, die Mechanismen der Habitus-Bildung sind. Unter dem Druck der Globalisierung besteht die größte Herausforderung darin, der in den unteren Mittelschichten aller Kulturen verbreiteten Verbindung von Bewegungen des Hasses mit Ressentiments entgegenzutreten. (shrink)

J. Dewey and H. Plessner both and independently of one another treated the central question of what new task philosophy must set itself if the assumption is correct that the life-form of mind, i.e., the mental life-form of humans, arose in nature and must also sustain itself in the future within nature. If nature has to reconceived so as to make the irreducible qualities of life and mind truly possible, then it can no longer be restricted to the role of (...) physical material. Conversely humans cannot no longer take on the role of God outside and independent of nature. Instead these philosophers distinguish between three “plateaus” or “stages”, between physical nature, psycho-physical nature and the nature that is mental life. This distinction is drawn such that a connection between the plateaus is truly possible. The third level, that of the mental form of life, answers mentally within conduct to the break with the first two levels. Hence it depends in the future as well on the continuously renewed difference in our experience of nature. Within this difference nature as a whole remains an open unknown, which is why we can credit Dewey with a philosophy of diversified and negative holism, Plessner with a differential philosophy of the negativity of the absolute. (shrink)

Name der Zeitschrift: Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie Jahrgang: 64 Heft: 6 Seiten: 1028-1033.

The author proposes that Tomasello's kind of asking and answering questions is a kind of quasi transcendental naturalism . It is transcendental in the sense that he asks about the structural and functional conditions that enable emprical phenomena. But he changes the direction of this question to its answer – namely to different time frames in nature and to empirical methods. Furthermore, the article proposes precisions of his conception regarding the intelligence of chimpanzees; the problem of imitation ; the difference (...) between biological environment, socio-cultural environment and frames of worlds for persons. Finally, the article limits his explanatory claims with regard to the distinctions community versus society, concrete roles versus generalized roles of others, and to the personal pronouns of you , we, you and they differing from the usual dualism of first person percpective versus third person perspective in singular. (shrink)